

Lesson Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Lesson ID: 92559-34062

Title: INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)

Operation/Exercise Name: MARFOR PROMOTE LIBERTY      Observed: 13 Jun 1990

Originator: COMMARFOR PANAMA

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5. (U) OBSERVATION:

Long range operations during a low intensity conflict (LIC) requires detailed information on local activities, infrastructure, terrain and enemy/potential insurgents.

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

Marine Forces (MARFOR) Panama participated in several long range operations into the interior of Panama. Prior to each operation a counter intelligence (CI) team was dispatched to the area to conduct reconnaissance and coordinate with the local Special Forces Team (SF). These two man teams wore civilian attire and drove a commercial vehicle. There was little chance they were not identified as "gringos," but it was likely that those who saw them assumed they were SF who used commercial vehicles and wore civilian attire in their area of operations (AO) regularly. This technique allowed gathering of information before an operation without early compromise of pending operations. If a force does not begin gathering information before arriving in an area it takes days perhaps weeks to become effective and the force is needlessly exposed. Attempting to infiltrate a large unit into an area is usually not possible. While some Army units used Panamanian "Chiva" buses to infiltrate units into various areas of operation, it is virtually impossible to hide for very long the fact that United States (U.S.) units are operating in the area. Essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR) need to be answered prior to moving into an area. For those EEI and OIR that cannot be answered by higher headquarters or external agencies, use CI teams.

7. () LESSON LEARNED:

8. (%) RECOMMENDED ACTION:

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7. (U) LESSON LEARNED:

(a) (U) Sound Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) of an area allows a unit to move into operations immediately upon arrival. Failure to do so means exposing the force while this information is gathered.

(b) (U) CI teams are one of the commanders immediate IPB assets.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: That CI teams be trained, organized and used for IPB.

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9. (U) COMMENTS:

None stated.

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